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ABSTRACT
This article looks at the issue of the fi rst report, which exceptionally permits a 
complainant in a sexual offence case to offer a previously consistent statement 
into evidence. In the law of evidence a previous consistent statement is 
a written or oral statement, made by a witness on some prior occasion to 
testifying, which is substantially similar to her testimony in court. Normally, 
previous consistent statements are deemed to be inadmissible at trial because 
such testimony is considered to be self-serving and lacking in probative value. 
However, throughout jurisdictions following the Anglo-American tradition 
previous consistent statements in sexual offences are allowed as an exception 
to the general rule. This article reviews the history of the fi rst report rule, 
including critical feminist legal critique of the rule’s origins. The paper 
proceeds with a comparative look at divergent approaches to reform that have 
emerged with the rule in foreign jurisdictions. This analysis includes a review 
of reform proposals from the South African Law Commission (now the South 
African Law Reform Commission) before looking at a recent controversial 
case in the Supreme Court of Appeal that dealt with the fi rst report, namely 
the case of S v Hammond.
I. Introduction 
The motivation behind this research originated from a series of workshops 
I attended with regional court magistrates in early 2005. The workshops, 
entitled ‘Contextualising Sexual Offences’ focused on the adjudication of 
sexual offences with particular attention paid to the diffi cult procedural 
and evidentiary issues facing judicial offi cers. During informal discussions 
and structured interviews with workshop participants various issues 
emerged that raised some concerns. Notably, there appeared to be a range 
of viewpoints from those interviewed when it came to providing a correct 
statement of the law as related to evidentiary issues in the adjudication of 
sexual offences. Some of the confusion related to the current state of the 
law of evidence as related to the cautionary rules, the use and function 
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of expert testimony, evaluating rape trauma syndrome and lastly the fi rst 
report. This article will focus on the fi rst report.  
The fi rst report, also known in some jurisdictions as ‘recent complaint’1 or 
the ‘de recenti exception,’ exceptionally permits a complainant in a sexual 
offence case to offer a previously consistent statement into evidence.2 In 
the law of evidence a previous consistent statement is a written or oral 
statement, made by a witness on some occasion prior to testifying, which 
is substantially similar to her testimony in court.3 Normally, previously 
consistent statements are deemed to be inadmissible at trial because such 
testimony is considered to be both ‘self-serving’ as well as ‘superfl uous 
and time-wasting’4 and generally lacking in probative value.5 However in 
South African law, as well as most other jurisdictions following the Anglo-
American tradition,6 previously consistent statements in sexual offences 
cases are allowed into evidence as an exception to the general rule in 
certain instances.7 Specifi cally, such statements will be admissible when: 
the statement is made voluntarily;8 the complainant also testifi es at trial;9 
and the complaint is made at the fi rst reasonable opportunity.10 
This article will proceed by reviewing: (1) the origins of the fi rst report 
rule; (2) application of the rule by South African courts leading up to 
the 2004 Supreme Court of Appeals case of State v Hammond;11 (3) the 
reform proposals of the South African Law Commission; (4) a comparative 
perspective on how this rule has been dealt with in other jurisdictions, 
taking notice of the divergent approaches in Canada (where the rule 
has been abrogated) and the United Kingdom (where exceptions to the 
prohibition on previous consistent statements have been expanded); and 
fi nally (5) a more detailed discussion of the case of S v Hammond12 and the 
diffi culty posed by the current interpretation of this rule for complainants 
in sexual offences cases.
1 See J Sopinka et al The Law of Evidence in Canada (1999) 321.
2 FE Raitt ‘Gender Bias in the Hearsay Rule’ in M Childs and L Ellison Feminist Perspectives 
on Evidence (2000) 74.
3 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2ed (2002) 100.
4 J Temkin Rape and the Legal Process (1987) 144.
5 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 101.
6 The common law rules of evidence were received into South African law from the English 
law of evidence. In terms of South African law of evidence, the applicable English common 
law rules and principles as of 30th May 1961 are binding on South African courts in terms of 
South African law of precedent. See Schwikkard op cit (n 3) 24. See also S v Desai 1997 (1) 
SACR 38 (W).
7 Notably, the Canadian Criminal Code s 275 has done away with the exception.
8 S v T 1963 (1) SA 484 (A).
9 R v Kgaladi 1943 AD 255.
10 S v De Villiers 1999 (1) SACR 297 (O).
11 S v Hammond 2004 (2) SACR 303 (SCA).
12 Ibid.
       
Evaluating the ‘First Report’ 39
II. First Report – Origins of the Rule
The rule’s origin, as with other evidentiary rules relating to sexual offences, 
dates back to the Middle Ages. Fundamentally, the rule displays a rather 
archaic notion of sexuality and an inherent distrust of female complainants 
in general. Early English law displayed confusion over whether rape was 
a crime against a woman’s body, or against a man’s property.13 In this 
earlier era the very defi nition of rape and whether it was an actionable 
offence hinged on the complainant’s prior status – specifi cally ‘unless 
she was a virgin beforehand, her complaint of rape had no validity.’14 For 
completeness it is also worth noting that during this earlier period a woman 
could save an offender from prosecution by marrying him, provided that 
the judicial offi cer and families were in agreement.  Alternatively, in the 
case of prosecution, the penalty imposed could vary based on the relative 
social status of the victim and offender.15 When looking at this historical 
context it is questioned to what extent these earlier views inform our 
law today, most notably the focus by courts on the status, conduct and 
character of the complainant in sexual offences.   
The rule emerges from the belief that there is some essential difference 
between a complainant alleging rape and those alleging other criminal 
offences.16 The assumption behind this view is that rape is an offence 
susceptible to false accusations and therefore allegations of rape require 
differential treatment.17  As Adler has argued, ‘the genuineness of the 
complaint appears to be judged primarily with reference to the character 
and behaviour’ of the complainant rather than that of the accused.18 It is 
worth noting that many of the principles informing the common law of 
rape in England, which have been received into the South African law of 
evidence, were set forth by Lord Hale during the seventeenth century. In 
fact, the logic informing the fi rst report rule as it stands today can be found 
in the following statement by Lord Hale made in 1736:
‘… the credibility of her testimony, and how far forth she is to be believed, must 
be left to the jury, and is more or less credible according to the circumstances of 
fact, that concur in that testimony. For instance, if the witness be of good fame, 
if she presently discovered the offence and made pursuit after the offender, 
showed circumstances and signs of injury… if the place wherein the fact was 
done was remote from people, inhabitants or passengers, if the offender fl ed 
from it; these and the like are concurring evidences to give great probability to 
her testimony when proved by others as well as herself. But on the other side, if 
she concealed the injury for any considerable time after she had the opportunity 
13 Z Adler Rape on Trial (1987) 20.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Adler op cit (n13)23.
17 Adler op cit (n13).
18 Ibid.
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to complain, if the place where the fact was supposed to be committed were 
near to inhabitants or common recourse or passage of passengers, and she made 
no outcry when the fact was supposed to be done, and where it is probable 
she might be heard by others; these and the like circumstances carry a strong 
presumption that her testimony is false or feigned.’ 19
The idea that a complainant must make an immediate report, also known 
as the requirement that a complainant should raise a ‘hue and cry’ at the 
time of the offence, has its origin in the Middle Ages.20 As Schwikkard has 
noted, 
‘the law of hue and cry not only applied to rape cases but to all offences of a 
violent nature [h]owever by the end of the nineteenth century it would appear 
that the “hue and cry” requirement was no longer applicable in offences not of 
a sexual nature.’21 
Tapper, a leading English writer on the law of evidence, has argued that 
over time the rule has become extremely technical and widely regarded 
as ‘anomalous and unsatisfactory’.22 What is perhaps most troubling about 
this rule, as with the cautionary rule, is that the law of evidence seems to 
focus on conduct of a female complainant, attributing a delay in reporting 
with inherent distrust. Further, the assumption underlying the view that a 
victim should report a sexual offence at the earliest possible opportunity 
is at best unfounded and misplaced.23 It is notable that in South Africa 
this exceptional rule has survived numerous law reform initiatives. It 
continues to feature controversially as a critical element in the evaluation 
of evidence in sexual offences cases, most notably the recent decision of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Hammond.24  
In Hammond the ‘technical’ and controversial aspect of this rule became 
apparent by the court’s ruling on what inferences can be drawn from 
the fi rst report. Notably, the court held that evidence of a complainant 
in a sexual offence case, if made at the earliest reasonable opportunity, 
is exceptionally admitted into evidence as matter going only to the 
complainant’s consistency, therefore to support credibility.25 Evidence 
of the prior complaint does not amount to truth of the matter asserted, 
which in most cases would be evidence as to lack of consent.26  
19 M Hale Historia Placitorum Coronae vol 1 (1736) 633 quoted in Adler op cit (n 13) 24.
20 C Tapper Cross & Tapper on Evidence 10ed (2004) 319. See also Schwikkard op cit (n 3) 
103.
21 PJ Schwikkard ‘A Critical Overview of Evidence Relevant to Rape Trials in South African 
Law’ in S Jagwanth et al Women and the Law (1994) 200.
22 Tapper op cit (n20).
23 R v Valentine [1996] 2 Cr App R 213. See also Satchwell J’s discussion of this problem in 
Holtzhauzen v Roodt 1997 (4) SA 766 (W).
24 S v Hammond supra (n11).
25 S v Hammond supra (n11) at paras 15, 16.
26 Ibid.
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III. First Report in South African Law of Evidence
A. Previous Consistent Statements – Basis for the Rule
In a criminal trial, therefore, there is a general rule that a previous consistent 
statement of a testifying witness is inadmissible as evidence of the facts 
stated.27 Also known as the common law rule against ‘narrative’ or ‘self-
corroboration’, the rule prohibits a witness from being asked as evidence 
in chief whether she made a previous statement ‘which tends to confi rm 
her testimony.’28 Further, as Hoffmann and Zeffertt explain, the previous 
statement may not be confi rmed by calling another witness to prove that 
the statement was made. This prohibition applies regardless of whether 
the earlier statement was oral or in writing.29
The main motivation behind the rule is that such a witness’s previous 
consistent statements are considered to be insuffi ciently relevant and 
lacking in probative value.30 It has further been argued that evidence of 
previously consistent statements ‘can easily be manufactured’ as a witness 
‘would be able to create any amount of evidence by repeating her story 
to a number of people.’31 Further, there is a practical consideration that 
proof of previous consistent statements in ‘each and every case would be 
extremely time-consuming and may pave the way for numerous collateral 
inquiries’.32
The exceptions to the previous consistent statement rule form a 
numerus clausus.33 Briefl y, these major exceptions include the following: 
(1) statements to rebut suggestions of recent fabrication; (2) prior out of 
court identifi cation; (3) where the previous consistent statement forms 
part of the res gestae;34 (4) refreshing memory; (5) statements made at 
arrest or on discovery of incriminating articles; and (6) recent statement 
by complainants in sexual offences.35 
27 Temkin op cit (n4) 144.
28 DT Zeffertt et al The South African Law of Evidence (2003) 403.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid. S v Mkohle 1990 (1) SACR 95 (A) 99d.
31 Zeffertt op cit (n28) 405.
32 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 101.
33 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 102. Zeffertt op cit (n28). For a contrary view, see Satchwell J in 
Holtzhauzen v Roodt supra (n23) at 774A who takes the view there is no numerus clauses 
of instances where evidence of previous consistent statements may be admitted on the basis 
of relevance as an exception to the general rule.
34 Literally meaning ‘the facts’ or ‘the transaction’ res gestae as described by Zeffertt et al 
is an all embracing description of different kinds of evidence associated with the time and 
circumstances of the transaction under investigation that are allowed into evidence, often 
exceptionally, because of their general relevance and probative value. See Zeffertt op cit 
(n28) 411-27.
35 See generally Schwikkard op cit (n3) 102-111.
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B. The First Report – Requirements
The doctrine of fi rst report or de recenti exception is based on the 
assumption that a victim of a sexual offence will make a verbal report of the 
incident at the earliest possible opportunity.36 In order for the statement to 
be received into evidence the statement must be made voluntarily37 and 
the complainant must testify at trial.38 The only inferences to be drawn 
from allowing evidence of the prior report is that of consistency in the 
complainant’s testimony and therefore to support the complainant’s 
credibility.39 South African courts have also felt comfortable drawing 
a negative inference from the lack of a fi rst report – namely, a negative 
inference as to credibility that the offence actually occurred or in most 
cases that the offence in question was consensual.40  
C. Voluntary Complaint
Evidence by a complainant of a fi rst report will be admitted into evidence 
if the statement is found to be made voluntarily, if the complainant further 
testifi es in court, and if the statement is made at the fi rst reasonable 
opportunity.41 The rule has been applied in the prosecution of cases 
involving rape, indecent assault and similar offences.42 Further, the rule 
now applies to male as well as female complainants43 and is no longer 
limited to sexual offences ‘where the absence of consent is an essential 
element’.44 In the case of R v Camelleri45 in 1922, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal extended the rule to male complainants in cases of sexual assault, 
although cautioning that ‘the complaint of an adult male would carry little 
weight’.46
In the case of S v T the court evaluated the requirement of a voluntary 
statement where the complainant’s mother ‘had threatened to hit her if she 
refused to disclose what the accused (the stepfather) had done to her.’47 
In this case the complainant, who at the time of the trial was 11 years old, 
alleged that her stepfather had sexually assaulted her on three separate 
occasions.  The diffi cult issue for the court concerned the fact that the fi rst 
report of these instances of sexual assault was only elicited from the child 
36 Raitt op cit (n2) 74.
37 S v T 1963 (1) SA 484 (A).
38 R v Kgaladi 1943 AD 255.
39 S v Hammond supra (n11).
40 S v Van der Ross 2002 (2) SACR 362 (C).
41 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 103-6.
42 Zeffertt op cit (n28) 405.
43 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 104. See also R v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122.
44 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 104. See also R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551.
45 R v Camelleri supra (n43).
46 Zeffertt op cit (n28) 405.
47 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 104. S v T supra (n37).
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following a threat of physical chastisement from her mother.   
Applying the law of England, the court looked at the case of R v Osborne 
where it was held that ‘a complaint in a sexual case is not inadmissible 
merely because it is made in reply to a question, but that it cannot be 
admitted if elicited by questions of a leading or intimidating character.’48 
Incredibly in this case, despite the existence of medical evidence of 
bruising showing sexual interference with the child, and evidence as to 
threats of intimidation by the appellant against the child, the court allowed 
the appeal setting aside the conviction and the sentence.49 Thus, despite 
other evidence pointing to the likelihood of a sexual assault, the court 
used a defi ciency in the fi rst report evidence to uphold the appeal. In 
many ways the reasoning used by the court in S v T50 foreshadows the 
type of reasoning still used by courts today, that is, to acquit in sexual 
offences cases based on doctrine as opposed to the totality of evidence.51
D. The Complainant Must Testify
Besides the voluntary nature of the complaint, another requirement for 
the fi rst report exception to apply is that the complainant must also testify 
in court. The fact that a victim complained, along with the contents of the 
complaint, will not be received into evidence by the court if the victim 
is unable to testify.52 The reasoning behind this rule is that admitting the 
terms of the complaint without testimony to back up the complaint would 
infringe the hearsay rule.53 An unusual application of this rule was seen in 
the case of S v R, where a complaint of rape was made immediately after 
the incident and was overheard by a nurse on at least two occasions.54 The 
problem emerged at trial that the complainant, who was found by the court 
to be an alcoholic and inebriated at the time of the alleged rape, suffered 
from amnesia.55 During her testimony at trial the complainant denied that 
she could have consented to the sexual intercourse as the accused alleged. 
However, due to her amnesia she could not remember what happened 
to her or what she said after the alleged offence. Though the accused 
objected to the prior statements being admitted into evidence, the court 
held that ‘the statements and their contents were relevant and therefore 
admissible to prove, not the truth of their contents, but the complainant’s 
state of mind at and just before they were made.’56
48 S v T supra (n37) quoting R v Osborne supra (n44).
49 See Schwikkard op cit (n3) 104. S v T (n37).
50 S v T supra (n37).
51 See the analysis to follow in this regard of S v Hammond supra (n11).
52 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 104-5.
53 Zeffertt op cit (n28) 407.
54 S v R 1965 (2) SA 463 (W).  
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
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Having dealt with the issue of voluntary complaint and the requirement 
that the victim must testify, the most controversial aspect to the rule is 
the requirement that the complaint be made at ‘the fi rst reasonable 
opportunity’.
E. Complaint Must Be Made At First Reasonable Opportunity
Recognising the historical origins of the rule as laid out above, the 
requirement that the complaint be made at the fi rst reasonable opportunity 
remains a foundational principle before allowing a complainant’s fi rst report 
into evidence.57 While the principle is clear, courts have interpreted fi rst 
reasonable opportunity with some latitude, allowing complaints by young 
children from after fi ve days up to a period of six weeks to be received 
into evidence.58 The fi rst reasonable opportunity is clearly a factual inquiry 
that can depend on numerous factors. These include whether anyone 
was available to whom a complainant could reasonably be expected to 
complain and, in the case of young children, the recognition on the part of 
the complainant as to the criminal nature of the act.59
The inherent problem with this requirement, namely the antiquated 
assumptions upon which it is based, has been critiqued by legal scholars 
and has gained recognition by courts.  As Schwikkard noted, the rule fails 
to take into account ‘the many psychological and social factors which may 
inhibit a rape survivor from making a complaint.’60 This view fi nds support 
in the English case of R v Valentine where the court notes that: 
‘victims of sexual offences, be they male or female, often need time before they 
can bring themselves to tell what has been done to them; that some victims 
will fi nd it impossible to complain to anyone other than a parent or member of 
their family whereas others may feel it quite impossible to tell their parents or 
members of their family.’61 
Doubts about this requirement have also crept into South African case 
law, most notably in the case of Holtzhauzen v Roodt. Here Satchwell J 
evaluates whether expert testimony should be allowed on the issue of a 
delay in reporting an allegation of rape. She writes: 
‘In the normal course this court would certainly be entitled to draw an inference 
that there was nothing for the defendant to report to her mother or to her 
sisters. Certainly, if a witness’ purse containing cash and credit cards and a 
cheque book had been stolen outside a bank, and the victim failed immediately 
to go inside and cancel the cheque book or credit cards and to make a report to 
the policeman standing on the street corner while the thieves made a getaway, 
then I would consider myself entirely justifi ed in drawing an adverse inference 
57 S v Hammond supra (n11).
58 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 105.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid. 
61 R v Valentine supra (n23) quoted in Schwikkard op cit (n3) 105.
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from such facts. If indeed there are particular reasons, known only or known 
particularly to those who work with rape survivors and who have experience 
in the fi eld, why rape survivors frequently do not take the fi rst opportunity to 
make known such an assault and to seek help, then it would ill behove me as a 
judge of the High Court to turn my ear against the opportunity to gain a better 
understanding from an available expert.’62
Beyond the requirements of the voluntariness of the complaint, the 
requirement that the complainant testify and that the complaint be made 
at the fi rst reasonable opportunity, the critical issue in application of the 
rule relates to the allowable inference which can be drawn from the 
statement.  As iterated most recently in the case of S v Hammond, the 
only inference that can be drawn from the statement is that of consistency 
going to the credibility of the complainant.63 Furthermore, as stated by 
the court in S v Van der Ross, despite the criticism raised above a court 
may draw a negative inference as to consistency, and in turn credibility, 
in circumstances where a fi rst report is not made at the fi rst reasonable 
opportunity.64 In reviewing the possible law reform options available to 
overcome the problems with this rule, the South African Law Commission 
has focused specifi cally on the negative inference issue as the main basis 
for reform.  As the remainder of this article will seek to argue, while 
removing the ability of the adjudicator to draw a negative inference from 
a late complaint may be a welcome reform, it still falls some ways short of 
addressing the fundamental problems with the rule.
IV. South African Law Commission (SALC) Proposed 
Reforms
Prior to 2002 the South African Law Commission concluded that the rules 
governing admission of a prior complaint in a sexual offence case did 
not require legal reform.65 In their 1985 report, as Schwikkard explains, 
the South African Law Commission took the position that the proper 
application of the rule did not prejudice the complainant. In fact it was 
submitted that it enhanced the prosecution’s case and ‘in absence of an 
admissible earlier complaint the fi nder of fact could – depending on the 
reasons why no complaint was made at the fi rst reasonable opportunity 
– draw correct inferences from all the circumstances.’66 By 2002 however, 
the South African Law Commission came to the realisation that the 
rule creates problems.67 Of particular concern to them is the issue that 
adjudicators can draw a negative inference when a ‘fi rst reasonable 
62 Holtzhausen v Roodt supra (n23) 778–9.
63 S v Hammond supra (n11).
64 S v Van der Ross supra (n40).
65 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 107.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
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opportunity’ complaint is lacking. The South African Law Commission 
acknowledged that this is a common practice by courts and ‘refl ects an 
assumption about the psychological effects of rape and other sexual 
offences and the conduct expected of a “reasonable” complainant which 
are not borne out by recent empirical studies in this area’.68 As the 2002 
case of S v Van der Ross highlights, with the slow pace of reform courts 
continue to draw a negative inference in the absence of a report made at 
the fi rst reasonable opportunity.69 
In their 2002 report on sexual offences (in preparation for the drafting 
of the pending Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill), the 
South African Law Commission revised its position and put forth various 
options for reform of the previous consistent statement exception in 
sexual offences. The fi rst option the South African Law Commission 
looked at involved totally abolishing the rule in line with the approach 
taken by Canadian lawmakers, with their abrogation of the rule in s 275 of 
the Canadian Criminal Code.70 The approach adopted by the Canadians 
(discussed in more detail below) is to treat the prior complaint in a sexual 
offences case like all other prior, out of court statements in criminal cases: 
exclude all such statements – unless admissibility can be gained on another 
ground, such as to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.71
In a second option, the South African Law Commission considered 
the provisions of Namibian legislation on this issue – notably s 6 of the 
Combating Rape Act.72 This section provides that evidence relating to all 
previous consistent statements by a complainant in a sexual offence case 
be admissible provided that ‘no inference shall be drawn only from the 
fact that no such previous statements have been made.’73 The effect of this 
provision is to do away with the fi rst reasonable opportunity requirement 
and allow prior complaints into evidence, regardless of their delay, provided 
the other requirements are met.74 Critically however, the South African 
Law Commission felt that while this option improves the current law, 
the provision does not eliminate the possibility ‘that a presiding judicial 
offi cer may draw an adverse inference where the complainant did delay in 
making her report’.75
The third option considered by the South African Law Commission 
involved looking at s 7 of the Namibian legislation along with certain 
68 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 (Project 107) ‘Sexual Offences: 
Process and Procedure’ (2002). 
69 S v Van der Ross supra (n40).
70 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 107. See South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 op 
cit (n68).
71 Schwikkard op cit (n3) 107-8.
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Australian state legislation.76 Section 7 of the Namibian legislation closes 
the gap with regard to drawing a negative inference from a delayed report. 
It provides that ‘the court shall not draw any inference only from the 
length of the delay between the commission of the sexual or indecent act 
and the laying of a complaint.’77
In conclusion, the South African Law Commission decided to adopt a 
modifi ed version of option two combined with option three, in the form 
of clauses 17 and 19 of the proposed Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Bill 
released in 2002.78  
Clause 17 states:
‘Evidence relating to relevant previous consistent statements by a complainant 
shall be admissible in criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with 
a sexual offence: Provided that no inference may be drawn only from the fact 
that no such previous statements have been made.’79
Clause 19 states:
In criminal proceedings at which an accused is charged with a sexual offence, the 
court shall not draw any inference solely from the length of any delay between 
the alleged commission of a sexual offence and the laying of the complaint in 
connection with such offence.80
As noted, these proposals are meant to fi nd expression in the Criminal 
Matters (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill, which was drafted in 2002 
and has been widely distributed. The continued delay with this piece of 
legislation is a matter of some frustration for those working in this area. 
Further, it seems that signifi cant changes continue to be incorporated into 
the draft Bill, leaving the current state of the reform process undetermined 
at best. Regardless, it is contended that the reforms as currently proposed 
by the South African Law Commission do not go far enough. This is 
particularly so if they are judged against the radical departure from 
conventional doctrine enacted by the United Kingdom’s Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 discussed below.  
V. Comparative Law Perspective 
A. Canadian position
In 1983 the Canadian legislature, recognizing the diffi culties experienced 
in terms of the so-called ‘recent complaint’ exception, amended the 
Canadian Criminal Code purportedly abolishing the use of such 
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill 2003.
79 South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 102 op cit (n68) at para 5. 4.2.
80 Ibid.
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evidence and ending the differential treatment of complainants in sexual 
offences.81 Section 275 of the Code provides that the rules relating to 
recent complaint evidence in a sexual offence case are abrogated.82 The 
effect of this rule is to ‘disallow the prosecution from adducing evidence 
of recent complaint as well as disallowing the judge from directing the jury 
as to any adverse inference to be drawn from the failure to produce such 
evidence.’83 Jennifer Temkin, a leading writer on the law of sexual offences, 
has disparagingly described the Canadian approach as ‘throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater.’84 While the motivation behind the abrogation 
of the rule is a desire to move away from the ‘prejudicial’ treatment of 
complainants in sexual offence cases (notably the drawing of a negative 
inference), the effect of removing the prohibition, argues Temkin, deprives 
the complainant ‘of the opportunity to adduce evidence which might 
tend to support her credibility in a situation in which she continues to be 
viewed with disbelief and suspicion’.85
In the judgment R v Page the Ontario Supreme Court noted that, in 
effect, the repeal of the recent complaint doctrine amounted to placing ‘a 
complaint of sexual assault on the same footing as the evidence of any other 
offence, e.g. robbery or fraud’.86 Ironically, in this case the court approached 
the abrogation of the rule with care by permitting the complainant to 
testify that she ‘caused the police to be called.’87 The complainant was not 
permitted to testify as to what she told the recipient of the complaint nor 
later what she told the police. However, the complainant and the police 
were both permitted to testify that she had made a statement. Further, 
the court allowed testimony from other witnesses as to the complainant’s 
emotional condition and her state of dress.88 
While reform efforts in Canada may have the perverse effect of making 
the truth gathering inquiry in sexual offences even more diffi cult, they 
must be commended for attempting to move away from a differential or 
specialised treatment of sexual offences within this area of criminal law. 
However, as Temkin argues, if decisions such as Page are to be followed, 
‘Canadian law will have slipped back to where it was in the nineteenth 
century when evidence of recent complaint but not details thereof was 
allowed in as evidence’.89 
81 Sopinka op cit (n1) 322. 
82 Ibid.
83 Temkin op cit (n4) 146.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 R v Page (1984) 40 C.R. (3d) 85.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Temkin op cit (n4) 147.
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B. United Kingdom position
While the South African Law Commission’s proposed reforms can be 
criticised for not going far enough and the Canadian position has been 
regarded as regressive, a more promising development can be found in 
the United Kingdom’s Criminal Justice Act 2003. The reforms to the law 
of evidence enacted by this piece of legislation have been described 
by one commentator as ‘the most far reaching since the 1898 Criminal 
Evidence Act.’90 While the major areas of reform relate to the reception 
of hearsay evidence and the adducing of bad character evidence, the Act 
also alters the way in which the law treats witnesses’ previous consistent 
statements.91 The main two effects of the reforms in this regard are: to 
extend the circumstances under which previous consistent statements 
can be adduced and; to allow all such admitted statements into evidence 
in their own right, for truth of the matter asserted, abolishing the notion of 
previous statements being admitted purely for the purposes of consistency 
or credibility.92
With the passing of this Act, under s120(7): 
‘a statement in the form of a complaint by a witness who claims to have 
been a victim of an offence, which the crime forms the subject-matter of the 
proceedings, which was made “as soon as could reasonably be expected” after 
the conduct it relates to, and in which the witness has fi rst given evidence, is 
admissible.’93  
In this one provision the law of fi rst report in the United Kingdom has 
been drastically altered in two ways. First, the fi rst report exception is 
extended beyond sexual offences to cover all offences. Secondly, the 
statement itself, once admitted into evidence, is admitted as evidence of 
truth of its contents rather than for credit or consistency.94
On both these accounts, the extension of the exception to all offences and 
expanding the basis upon which reception of the statement is allowed, the 
United Kingdom reform overturns centuries of discriminatory doctrine. 
Guiding these reforms were fi ndings by the Law Commission of England 
and Wales that ‘the preconditions for adducing recent complaints that had 
been established in sexual cases were too strict and should be relaxed.’95  
In terms of allowing previous consistent testimony as evidence in its 
own right, rather than merely for purposes of credit or consistency, the Law 
Commission of England and Wales concluded that the main justifi cation for 
the prior limitation related to the hearsay rule and the probative value of 
90 G Durston ‘Previous (In)Consistent Statements After the Criminal Justice Act 2003’ (2005) 
Crim LR 206.
91 Ibid.
92 Durston op cit (n90) 206-7.
93 Durston op cit (n90) 211.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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out of court statements.96 As such concerns should not apply to a witness’s 
own earlier statement it was logical, so the Law Commission reasoned, 
that the hearsay rules should no longer apply to previous consistent 
statements.97 As regards expanding the exception of fi rst report evidence 
beyond sexual complaints, the Law Commission has sought to move 
away from a differential treatment of sexual offences and other criminal 
offences. Critically, the Law Commission’s reforms take the view that early 
post-crime statements in general, across a range of the possible offences, 
are more likely to be accurate in their accounting of events and ‘that they 
also ran a smaller risk of being “corrupted” by subsequent events’.98
Compared with Canada, or for that matter the proposals of the South 
African Law Commission as expressed in the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences) Amendment Bill, the expansion of the use of previous 
consistent statements to cover all offences is a radical departure. Its worth 
remembering that the justifi cation for the limit of this exception to sexual 
offences has always hinged on the perception that sexual offences are 
somehow different from other types of crimes – as one judge stated 
‘because sexual activity tends to take place in private and is usually kept 
secret.’99 However this sort of reasoning can be applied to any number of 
criminal offences, such as domestic violence, where evidence of a prior 
recent complaint under current South African law would be subject to 
the exclusionary rule.100 Further, by allowing the prior statement into 
evidence as a matter going to the truth of its contents the English reforms 
enact a major shift in the balance to be struck in sexual offences cases. 
This type of reform will allow magistrates and judges to move beyond the 
often diffi cult and ‘illogical’ exercise, evidenced in cases such as Page and 
Hammond, where statements are grudgingly admitted into evidence only 
to be circumscribed by doctrine (as opposed to logic) as to their limited 
probative value.101
What remains less certain in the United Kingdom reforms is what is 
meant in s 120(7) by the phrase ‘as soon as could reasonably be expected’. 
Specifi cally, it appears that this language retains the ‘fi rst reasonable 
opportunity’ requirement.102 However, following the case law, perhaps this 
is not too great a concern.  As Durston has argued, courts in the United 
Kingdom following the case of R v Valentine103 ‘have taken an increasingly 
understanding approach to delays in complaining about sexual assaults, 
having regard to the nature of the complainant and her relationship 
96 Durston op cit (n90) 206.
97 Ibid.
98 Durston op cit (n90) 213.
99 Durston op cit (n90) quoting Tudor Evans J in Jarvis 1991 Crim LR 374. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Durston op cit (n90) 206.
102 Ibid.
103 R v Valentine supra (n61).
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to potential confi dantes.’ The view put forth by Durston suggests that 
regardless of whether the drafters sought to retain the fi rst reasonable 
opportunity requirement, courts have recognised the problems associated 
with the requirement and sought to soften the rule’s potentially harsh 
application.104
VI. S v Hammond
In the Hammond case, the Supreme Court of Appeal confi rmed the rule in 
South African law that evidence of a complaint in a sexual misconduct case, 
given at the earliest reasonable opportunity, is exceptionally admitted only 
as evidence of consistency in the account given by the complainant. The 
judgment in the case was handed down in September 2004 by Cloete JA 
with Brand JA and Comrie AJA concurring. The case reached the Supreme 
Court of Appeal following a conviction for rape of the appellant Angelo 
Hammond by a regional court magistrate in Mitchell’s Plain. Hammond 
was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. An appeal to the Cape High 
Court was dismissed ‘on the basis that there was no misdirection by the 
magistrate’.105 On further appeal, Cloete JA found that the magistrate had 
in fact ‘misdirected himself in several fundamental respects’106 and the 
Supreme Court of Appeal granted the appeal, ordering that the appellant’s 
conviction and sentence be set aside. 107
To summarise the facts of the case, on the day in question at around 
noon the appellant and his friends came across the complainant and her 
friends at the beach.  Apparently the individuals in each group had not 
previously met. Both parties were consuming alcohol and they continued 
to drink together. At around 16h00, the appellant and his friends offered 
the complainant a lift to Mitchell’s Plain, where she had to collect her 
child who was staying with other family members.108 However, instead 
of going to Mitchell’s Plain the appellant drove with the complainant and 
his friends to purchase more alcohol, which they consumed. The disputed 
facts in the case relate to what occurred next.109
According to the complainant’s evidence, she testifi ed that the appellant 
stopped by the side of the road, stepped outside of the vehicle and walked 
over to the passenger side where she was seated. Next the appellant pulled 
the complainant out of the vehicle and grabbed her by her hair pulling her 
across a stony pathway approximately 14 metres away from the vehicle. 
104 Durston op cit (n90).
105 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 2.
106 Ibid.
107 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 26.
108 Described in Cloete JA’s judgment as the complainant’s ‘parents-in-law’ at para 3.
109 Ibid.  I should note that the summary of the facts vary in minor details from the reported 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal and that of the High Court judgment of Ismail AJ 
Angelo Hammond v the State case no. A634/02.
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During the course of being dragged, the complainant gashed her leg. The 
appellant then proceeded to rape her. The complainant testifi ed that she 
screamed to the appellant ‘moet dit nie doen nie’.110 Further, while the 
appellant was raping her, a witness (one of the appellant’s friends) Neil 
Mitchell, asked the appellant how much longer he would be.
The appellant’s version of the story, as described by Cloete JA, is that 
the appellant ‘made amorous advances towards the complainant whilst 
they were in the motor car, she reciprocated and they had consensual 
intercourse’.111 The appellant further alleged that the complainant had 
gashed her leg earlier, when she stumbled and fell. The appellant’s evidence 
that the complainant was a willing party was corroborated by his friend 
Neil Mitchell.
The issue of the fi rst report emerges shortly after the alleged rape.  After 
the alleged rape, the appellant’s vehicle got stuck in the sand.  A landrover 
arrived with four fi shermen in it – two of whom, Messrs Steyn and English, 
received the fi rst report from the complainant. Both Steyn and English 
gave evidence in the case on behalf of the State. Steyn testifi ed that as soon 
as they stopped their car the complainant approached them saying ‘help 
my meneer die man het my ge-rape’.112 The testimony of English was 
reported in the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment as follows:
‘She was upset and her hair was all wild and things… she was upset, she – I 
think she was crying, ja. And anyway we proceeded to help these guys to get 
their car out of the sand. And in that time she wanted to get into the van and 
she was mumbling on about, you know, that she had been raped and things… 
She was upset. To my mind she was upset, but I know – I am not a person with a 
breathalyser or anything but to my mind she looked like she had been drinking, 
she had (had) alcohol of some sort.’113
There are a few other issues of fact which require comment before 
proceeding with an analysis of Cloete JA’s judgment. The fi rst fact, which 
fi nds no mention in Cloete JA’s judgment but which can be found in the 
record of the case, is that the complainant was a member of the South 
African Police Services. While the complainant’s status should have no 
effect on a legal fi nding of guilt or innocence on the part of the appellant, 
the fact that the Supreme Court of Appeal found it to be immaterial and 
not worthy of mention is surprising. What Cloete JA did fi nd material 
relating to the complainant’s conduct, and this is repeated on numerous 
occasions in his judgment, is the fact that the complainant consumed a 
110 ‘[d]on’t do it.’ These facts come from the ruling of the High Court, case no A634/02. 
Details relating to the complainant’s screaming were omitted from the Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgment.
111 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 3.
112 ‘[h]elp me sir, this man raped me.’ Angelo Hammond v The State supra (n109).
113 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 5.
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large amount of alcohol and was intoxicated.114 Cloete JA describes at 
length the amount of alcohol consumed by the complainant, a fact which 
receives mere mention in the High Court judgment. The Magistrate’s Court 
ruling in this regard found that despite the consumption of alcohol on the 
day, based on the testimony of the complainant and the district surgeon 
who examined the complaint, she was not drunk.115 
Turning to the basis of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision to 
accept the appeal and reverse the conviction and sentence in the case, 
the judgment of Cloete JA turns on his interpretation of the fi rst report 
exception and his own fi ndings of credibility as regards the complainant, 
the appellant and the witnesses in the case (fi ndings in contradiction 
with those of the magistrate and the Cape High Court). Over the course 
of fi ve paragraphs, in what is a relatively short judgment (26 paragraphs 
in all), Cloete JA muses over the old English and Australian case law on 
the issue.  At issue for Cloete JA is what he describes as the ‘fundamental 
misdirection’ by the magistrate in the case ‘as to the purpose for which 
evidence of a complaint in a case of sexual misconduct such as present 
may be received’.116 Critical for Cloete JA in this regard is to dispute that a 
fi rst report complaint is admissible for two purposes, ‘namely to show the 
consistency of the complainant’s evidence, and to negative consent’.117 
Beginning with what he unfortunately describes as ‘the seminal’ English 
case of R v Lillyman118 and continuing with a line of cases up through 
the 1970s, Cloete JA disputes the view that the complaint can be used 
for anything other than consistency and can never be used to negative 
consent.
Returning to the magistrate’s fi nding in the case, Cloete JA fi nds that 
the magistrate impermissibly ‘in weighing up the totality of the evidence 
had regard to the complaint and its terms as constituting a probability in 
favour of the State’s case which tended to disprove consent, which was at 
issue – indeed, the only issue – in the case’.119  
Furthermore, Cloete JA disagrees with the magistrate’s reasoning in 
the case on another point. Astonishingly, this relates to the condition of 
the complainant’s hair. The complainant gave evidence that the appellant 
pulled her by the hair and dragged her on the ground to the place where 
she was raped. This was the only explanation placed before the court for 
the condition of the complainant’s hair. The magistrate further relied on 
the testimony of the fi shermen, Steyn and English, that the complainant’s 
hair was ‘wild’ as corroboration for the complainant’s testimony. Further, 
114 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 23.
115 Angelo Hammond v The State supra (n109).
116 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 11.
117 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 12.
118 R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167. 
119 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 17.
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the magistrate found that the appellant’s evidence that he did not notice 
the complainant’s hair was an attempt by him to conceal the truth from 
the court.120
In response to these fi ndings, Cloete JA writes that he fi nds the 
magistrate’s reasoning ‘entirely unconvincing.’121 Then in an extraordinary 
passage in the judgment Cloete JA states, ‘[a] woman who has been 
drinking steadily since noon, who is inebriated and had just had sexual 
intercourse on the beach, is likely to look more than a little unkempt.’122 
In this passage, Cloete JA dispels the credibility of the complainant, the 
value of the fi rst report and reasserts the age-old logic of the inherently 
distrustful, and in this case, wanton female complainant. The rest of his 
judgment focuses on casting doubt on the credibility of the complainant’s 
version of events, including evidence of her emotional state as relayed 
by the fi shermen. In each instance, Cloete JA returns continuously to the 
fi nding, contrary to the fi nding of the magistrate and the Cape High Court, 
that the complainant was drunk.  As to her emotional state, Cloete JA casts 
doubt on whether this could be attributed to the alleged rape, reasoning 
as follows:
‘She was intoxicated. She would have some explaining to do to her “parents-
in-law” as to why she failed to collect her children during the afternoon so 
that they could attend school the next day. And her fi ancé, whom she said she 
would have seen that night, would no doubt have asked questions as to her 
whereabouts – particularly if he had seen her in the condition testifi ed to by the 
two fi shermen, Steyn and English. Or she may have been overcome by remorse, 
perhaps induced by the quantity of alcohol she had consumed.’123
In summary, Cloete JA states that despite the allegation and acceptance of 
the fi rst report given to the fi sherman as a matter going only to credibility, 
the complainant’s evidence was unsatisfactory.124 She was a single witness 
– ‘she was drunk and had behaved irrationally earlier in the afternoon’.125 
Furthermore, he found that she had lied as to her state of sobriety and 
therefore the case required application of the cautionary rule. By contrast, 
Cloete JA found the appellant’s evidence to be ‘beyond reproach’ and 
that this evidence was corroborated by the friend, Mitchell. Lastly, Cloete 
JA held that the magistrate’s fi nding of the complainant’s hair and the 
interpretation of the fi rst report supporting the allegation of rape could 
not be sustained.126
120 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 18.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 23.
124 S v Hammond supra (n11) at para 25.
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VII. Conclusions
The decision of Cloete JA in Hammond defi nitively states the current 
position in South African law as to the admissibility of a complainant’s fi rst 
report, at the earliest reasonable opportunity, in a sexual offence case as 
evidence going only to the complainant’s consistency. This position must 
be contrasted with the recent reforms to the law of evidence in the United 
Kingdom (overturning centuries of case law relied upon by Cloete JA in 
his judgment) that such evidence can be admitted as to the truth of the 
matter asserted, which in the case of Hammond means evidence as to 
lack of consent.
One of the main arguments put forward in this article is that the reform 
proposals put forth by the South African Law Commission in this area 
do not go far enough, as they keep the basic logic for the fi rst report 
exception in place. If we were to apply the South African Law Commission 
recommendations to the facts of Hammond there is no reason to believe 
that Cloete JA’s reasoning in this case would be disrupted. In the judgment 
there is no drawing of a negative inference because the fi rst report was 
made immediately. What is critical in Cloete JA’s judgment, which the 
South African Law Commission recommendations do not address, is the 
permissible inference to be drawn from a recent fi rst report once admitted 
– namely the issue of credibility. Thus in Hammond, despite the fact that 
the fi rst report evidence is deemed admissible, its reception into evidence 
is entirely circumscribed. Cloete JA even fi nds the magistrate’s reasoning 
– that the fi rst report creates a probability that the complainant’s 
allegation is true – to be a ‘fundamental misdirection’. Rather, if the fi rst 
report evidence is admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, together 
with the totality of the evidence in Hammond, the adjudicator would be 
required to come to a different conclusion.
In summary, while the law reform process as regards sexual offences 
continues to take place in South Africa, with due respect, it is critical that 
the South African Law Commission and the relevant legal drafters revisit 
this issue and interrogate whether the reforms as currently proposed 
adequately address the problems. Fundamentally, lawmakers must ask 
why we continue to treat sexual offences differently from other criminal 
offences and what assumptions underlie this differential treatment. While 
the South African law of evidence owes its foundational principles to the 
law of England, historically this has been to the disadvantage of female 
complainants who have been viewed with skepticism and inherent 
distrust. Perhaps the current reforms, as proposed by the Criminal Justice 
Act of 2003 in the United Kingdom, provide a way forward to overcoming 
centuries of unfair and discriminatory doctrine.
       
